New freeze-resistant trichinella species discovered

Kim Kaplan of USDA’s Agricultural Research Service writes a new freeze-resistant Trichinella species has been discovered in wolverines by Agricultural Research Service scientists and their colleagues. Trichinella are parasites that cause the disease trichinosis (formally referred to as trichinellosis), which people can get by eating raw or undercooked meat from infected animals. 

Before the advent of modern biosafety practices, Americans risked infection from Trichinella spiralis from contaminated pork. Residual risk exists when consuming wild game infected with this, or other species of Trichinella.

Freezing pork for three days generally kills T. spiralis but will not kill freeze-resistant varieties endemic to the Arctic. This study indicates freeze-resistance in this newly discovered species.

This is the first species of Trichinella discovered since 2012, and the 13th species identified since the genus was discovered in 1835.

The new species, now named Trichinella chanchalensis (and nicknamed “oddball”), was found in 14 of 338 wolverine samples tested. About 70 percent of the wolverine samples were infected by some Trichinella species. The samples were all provided by Canadian authorities that oversee trappers and/or game meat food safety in that country.

Wolverines, the largest member of the weasel family, are found mostly in northern Canada, Alaska, Nordic countries in Europe and throughout western Russia and Siberia.

“They make an excellent sentinel species to help us understand the scope of Trichinella in the environment,” said ARS research zoologist Peter Thompson who led the study. “A wolverine can have a home range of about 1,000 miles and will eat just about anything it can kill or scavenge, including caribou, moose, ground squirrels and other rodents as well as carnivores such as foxes and even other wolverines.” Thompson is with the ARS Animal Parasitic Diseases Laboratory in Beltsville, Maryland.

When the researchers first saw the new freeze-resistant Trichinella, they sought to understand if there had been interbreeding between T. nativa and T6, another freeze-resistant variety that is closely related to T. nativa.

By sequencing the newly discovered Trichinella species’ complete genome, it was shown that its DNA is about 10 percent different from any other Trichinella. By comparison, human and chimpanzee DNA only differ by 1 percent.

“Evolutionarily, the evidence shows that Trichinella chanchalensis split off from the other known Trichinella species about 6 million years ago, making it a very old species among Trichinella,” Thompson said. “That brings up the question of how T. nativa and T6 got their freeze resistance. Did the trait evolve more than once or is there some other mechanism at work?”

The ARS Animal Parasitic Diseases Laboratory, which is part of the Beltsville Agricultural Research Center, has a long history of helping provide the scientific basis for regulations that in the past ensured cured and cooked pork products were safe and reliable. Some of the lab’s accomplishments include:

Discovered that Trichinella can be reduced in pork by proper freeze methods, leading to new, effective meat inspection control measures in the first decade of the 20th century.

Established the standards for using salt, moisture, pH and temperature to effectively treat fermented, dry-cured pork sausage for Trichinella.

Assisted in the development of the best management practices for raising pigs to essentially eliminate the chances of domestic pork being infected with Trichinella.

Created the Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) test to specifically identify Trichinella species using a small DNA sample.

This research was published in the International Journal for Parasitology (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpara.2020.01.003)

The Agricultural Research Service is the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s chief scientific in-house research agency. Daily, ARS focuses on solutions to agricultural problems affecting America. Each dollar invested in agricultural research results in $20 of economic impact.

Tularemia in muskrats: Long Point, Ontario (that’s in Canada)

For a Brantford kid, Port Dover on the glimmering shores of Lake Erie was the closest beach; but for the full Lake Erie experience, we would drive a little further west to Long Point.

My friend Scott Weese, who is apparently treating the lock-down like I do, by writing more because ya don’t have to waste time at stupid meetings or commuting, writes in his Worms and Germs Blog that a recent report from the Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative (CWHC) describes an outbreak of tularemia in muskrats in Long Point, Ontario. Tularemia is a potentially nasty disease caused by the bacterium Francisella tularensis. While not many people have contact with muskrats or live in Long Point, it’s still noteworthy.

 The investigation was initiated following a report of at least 35 sick or dead muskrats in the area. Necropsies were done on some of the rodents, and they were found to have enlarged lymph nodes and lesions in their spleens and livers. Testing at the National Microbiology Laboratory identified Francisella tularensis.  This was done at the national lab because F. tularensis is a containment level 3 pathogen requiring enhanced biosafety practices – so it’s not a bacterium which regular labs handle.

This isn’t a new finding, since we know this bacterium is present in Ontario, but it’s rare. Francisella tularensis is sporadically found in various animals and rarely in people (there’s been one reported human case in Ontario so far in 2020). It’s a reportable disease in animals and people because of the potential severity of infection, and because it’s a potential bioterrorism agent.

Back to the muskrats… tularemia is a rare finding in wildlife. That doesn’t mean it doesn’t cause disease, since sporadic disease in wildlife rarely gets investigated. It’s most commonly associated with rabbits, and human and domestic animal infections can be associated with rabbit or rodent contact. The fact that this occurred as an outbreak with a significant number of animals affected over a short period of time is interesting, and it’s also concerning from human and animal health standpoints. The bacterium can be spread in a variety of ways, including direct contact, inhalation (e.g. running over an infected animal with a lawnmower and aerosolizing the bug and then breathing it in… gross but true) and via some insects (e.g. ticks, deer flies).

Tularemia avoidance measures are pretty basic:

Avoid contact with wildlife, live or dead.

People handling dead wildlife, especially those handling them closely such as trappers, should use good routine hygiene and infection control practices.

Avoid ticks. For pets, that involves use of a good tick preventive. For the rest of us, well… we don’t have a chewable tick preventive but we can do other things to reduce the risk of tick exposure, including (and most importantly) doing “tick checks” if you’ve been outside in an area where ticks are likely to be lurking.

Keep your pets under control, especially if they are prone to chasing wildlife or snacking on dead animals (also gross but true).

The CWHC warning is pretty similar to my comments: “During an outbreak situation, it is presumed that bacterial levels would be higher in the surrounding environment, so caution is warranted for anyone who is traversing through the area or wading into the water in the Crown Marsh area of Long Point. There is also a danger to off-leash dogs as they can become infected and develop similar symptoms to humans, especially if they consume infected meat. It is recommended that dogs are kept on leash and monitored closely while in this area. It is recommended that people do not handle wildlife found dead unless they are wearing protective gloves (or a similar protective barrier) to prevent direct contact of the animal with the skin. Anyone who handles dead wildlife (even while wearing the appropriate protective gear) should wash their hands thoroughly to minimize the chances of exposure.”

A related topic that applies to animals and people is talking to healthcare providers about travel. The risk for various diseases differs geographically. A disease might not be on a physician’s or veterinarian’s list of considerations if they don’t know about travel. So, physicians and veterinarians need to query travel history, and everyone needs to remember that travel means going somewhere else, regardless where it is (even if they haven’t left the province).

Here’s a scenario that highlights that:

Me: Have you traveled with your dog lately?

Owner: No.

Me: Do you have a cottage?

Owner: Yes, it’s a beautiful place a couple of hours from here. We go there every weekend in the summer.

Me: So, you travel with your dog every weekend in the summer?

Owner: Well, that’s not travel, it’s going to the cottage.

Me: Ok, now let’s talk about the different things I need to consider now that I know your dog travels.

That’s not an unusual situation. Understanding where people and animals have been is important when thinking about infectious disease risks. Veterinarians and owners need to clearly communicate to identify potential problems.

Travel, sprouts (the raw kind) and reptiles significant sources of Salmonella in Ontario

Former hockey buddy and nice veterinarian Scott McEwen at the University of Guelph (that’s in Ontario, Canada) is one of the authors of a paper investigating Salmonella Heidelberg and Salmonella Typhimurium role in human salmonellosis in Ontario. Introduction of the Ontario Investigation Tools (OIT) in 2014 allowed for standardized case investigation and reporting. This study compared the risk factors and symptomatology for sporadic S. Heidelberg and S. Typhimurium cases reported in Ontario in 2015, following implementation of the OIT.

Multilevel logistic regression models were applied to assess associations between serotype and individual‐level demographic characteristics, exposures and symptoms for sporadic confirmed cases of S. Heidelberg and S. Typhimurium in Ontario in 2015. There were 476 sporadic cases of S. Typhimurium (n = 278) and S. Heidelberg (n = 198) reported in Ontario in 2015. There were significant associations between the odds of the isolate from a case being one of these serotypes, and travel, consumption of sprouts (any type), contact with reptiles and development of malaise, fever or bloody diarrhoea.

The S. Typhimurium and S. Heidelberg cases differed in both symptom presentation and risk factors for illness. Case–case comparisons of Salmonella serotypes have some advantages over case–control studies in that these are less susceptible to selection and recall bias while allowing for rapid comparison of cases to identify potential high‐risk exposures that are unique to one of the serotypes when compared to the other.

Comparing cases of two different Salmonella serotypes can help to highlight risk factors that may be uniquely associated with one serotype, or more strongly associated with one serotype compared to another. This information may be useful for understanding relative source attribution between common serotypes of Salmonella.

A case-case study comparing the individual risk factors and symptomatology of salmonella Heidelberg and salmonella typhimurium in Ontario, 04 May 2020

Zoonoses and Public Health

Katherine Paphitis, David L. Pearl, Olaf Berke, Scott A. McEwen, Lise Trotz‐Williams

https://doi.org/10.1111/zph.12709

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/zph.12709?af=R

Japan’s poop museum — online

A museum dedicated to poop first opened in Odaiba, Japan in 2019, and quickly became one of the most Instagrammable spots for Hongkongers to visit. And now, the museum is taking things online.

Browse through the museum’s collection of poop art and drawings, try your hand at an interactive game involving flying neon turds, and you can even download a few poopy wallpapers to use during your video chat sessions.

Raw milk cheese still risky – even in France

Raw milk cheeses are commonly consumed in France and are also a common source of foodborne outbreaks (FBOs). Both a FBO surveillance system and a laboratory-based surveillance system aim to detect Salmonella outbreaks.

In early August 2018 5 familial FBOs due to Salmonella spp. were reported to a regional health authority. Investigation identified common exposure to a raw goats’ milk cheese, from which Salmonella spp. were also isolated, leading to an international product recall. Three weeks later, on 22 August, a national increase in Salmonella Newport ST118 was detected through laboratory surveillance. Concomitantly isolates from the earlier familial clusters were confirmed as S. Newport ST118. Interviews with a selection of the laboratory identified cases revealed exposure to the same cheese, including exposure to batches not included in the previous recall, leading to an expansion of the recall. The outbreak affected 153 cases, including 6 cases in Scotland. S. Newport was detected in the cheese and in milk of one of the producer’s goats.

The difference in the two alerts generated by this outbreak highlight the timeliness of the FBO system and the precision of the laboratory-based surveillance system. It is also a reminder of the risks associated with raw milk cheeses.

Outbreak of salmonella Newport associated with internationally distributed raw goats’ milk cheese, France, 2018, 04 May 2020

Epidemiology & Infection pp.1-23

Robinson(a1)(a2)M. Travanut (a3)L. Fabre (a4)S. Larréché (a5)L. Ramelli (a6)L. Pascal (a6)A. Guinard (a7)N. Vincent (a8)C. Calba (a8)L. Meurice (a9)MA. Le Thien (a10)E. Fourgere (a10)G. Jones (a1)N. Fournet (a1)A. Smith Palmer (a11)D. Brown (a12)S. Le Hello (a4)M. Pardos de la Gandara (a4)FX. Weill (a4) and N. Jourdan Da Silva (a

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0950268820000904

https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/epidemiology-and-infection/article/outbreak-of-salmonella-newport-associated-with-internationally-distributed-raw-goats-milk-cheese-france-2018/528E4E70FB25CDBB293627227740E39D
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From the duh files: Your chicken is no longer pink. That doesn’t mean it’s safe to eat

The New York Times followed up on the chicken study and how to tell if it’s done that I wrote about last week with a meandering story about color, texture, and stupidly recommends using pop-up thermometers.

Me and the U.S. Department of Agriculture and many others have been saying the same thing for over 20 years: Use a fucking tip-sensitive digital thermometer.

That is all.

Blue Bell’s Ex.-CEO charged in conspiracy to cover up Listeria outbreak

Christopher Mele of the New York Times writes the former chief executive of Blue Bell Creameries was charged with conspiracy in connection with his repeated efforts to cover up what became a deadly outbreak of listeria in some of the company’s products in 2015.

In addition, the company pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor counts of distributing adulterated ice cream products and agreed to pay a total of $19.4 million in fines, forfeitures and civil payments — the second-largest amount ever paid to resolve a food safety case, officials said. (Chipotle Mexican Grill last month agreed to pay a $25 million fine related to charges stemming from more than 1,100 cases of foodborne illnesses.)

Prosecutors charged that Blue Bell, which is based in Brenham, Texas, about 75 miles northwest of Houston, distributed ice cream products that were manufactured under unsanitary conditions and contaminated with Listeria monocytogenes.

Three deaths and 10 hospitalizations across four states were tied to the 2015 outbreak, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported.

The former chief executive, Paul Kruse, who was also Blue Bell’s president, directed a scheme to cover up the discovery that some products tested positive for listeria, according to court papers. He directed a company employee to stop a testing program for listeria even after two samples sent to a lab came back positive, court records said.

Further, Mr. Kruse did not order the recall of the affected products despite Blue Bell filing a report to federal regulators that it was recalling them “as quickly as possible,” court papers said.

For a period of more than two months in 2015, Mr. Kruse learned from state and federal officials as well as third-party labs that test samples of at least seven company ice cream products made at two different plants had tested positive for listeria, court papers said.

Yet, prosecutors contend, he repeatedly minimized, ignored or tried to cover up the problem products, which included Blue Bell Great Divide Bar and Chocolate Chip Country Cookie, despite concerns raised by company employees and customers, including a Kansas hospital and a Florida school.

For instance, he directed employees to tell customers that there had been an unspecified issue with a manufacturing machine rather than that samples of the products had tested positive for listeria, officials said.

On Feb. 17, 2015, Mr. Kruse rejected sending a draft news release about two products that tested positive for listeria, the withdrawal of those products and a warning to consumers about the potential health consequences. Mr. Kruse instructed the company executive who brought him the proposed release that it was unnecessary, court papers said.

Chris Flood, a lawyer for Mr. Kruse, said on Friday that his client was innocent of the charges.

Blanching fruit and vegetables not good enough to control Listeria

A multi‐country outbreak of Listeria monocytogenes ST6 linked to blanched frozen vegetables (bfV) took place in the EU (2015–2018). Evidence of food‐borne outbreaks shows that L. monocytogenes is the most relevant pathogen associated with bfV.

The probability of illness per serving of uncooked bfV, for the elderly (65–74 years old) population, is up to 3,600 times greater than cooked bfV and very likely lower than any of the evaluated ready‐to‐eat food categories. The main factors affecting contamination and growth of L. monocytogenes in bfV during processing are the hygiene of the raw materials and process water; the hygienic conditions of the food processing environment (FPE); and the time/Temperature (t/T) combinations used for storage and processing (e.g. blanching, cooling). Relevant factors after processing are the intrinsic characteristics of the bfV, the t/T combinations used for thawing and storage and subsequent cooking conditions, unless eaten uncooked.

Analysis of the possible control options suggests that application of a complete HACCP plan is either not possible or would not further enhance food safety. Instead, specific prerequisite programmes (PRP) and operational PRP activities should be applied such as cleaning and disinfection of the FPE, water control, t/T control and product information and consumer awareness. The occurrence of low levels of L. monocytogenes at the end of the production process (e.g. < 10 CFU/g) would be compatible with the limit of 100 CFU/g at the moment of consumption if any labelling recommendations are strictly followed (i.e. 24 h at 5°C). Under reasonably foreseeable conditions of use (i.e. 48 h at 12°C), L. monocytogenes levels need to be considerably lower (not detected in 25 g). Routine monitoring programmes for L. monocytogenes should be designed following a risk‐based approach and regularly revised based on trend analysis, being FPE monitoring a key activity in the frozen vegetable industry.

The public health risk posed by Listeria monocytogenes in frozen fruit and vegetables including herbs, blanched during processing, 20 April 2020

EFSA

DOI: 

10.2903/j.efsa.2020.6092

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/6092

Coronavirus communication and trust

The global coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has already had an enormous impact and will surely have profound consequences for many years to come.

The authors reflect on three risk communication themes related to the pandemic: trust, tradeoffs, and preparedness. Trust is critically important during such a rapidly evolving event characterized by scientific uncertainty. Reflections focus on uncertainty communication, transparency, and long-term implications for trust in government and science. On tradeoffs, the positive and unintended negative effects of three key risk communication messages are considered (1) stay at home, (2) some groups are at higher risk, and (3) daily infections and deaths.

The authors argue that greater attention to message ‘tradeoffs’ over ‘effectiveness’ and ‘evaluation’ over ‘intuition’ would help guide risk communicators under pressure. On preparedness, past infectious disease outbreak recommendations are examined. Although COVID-19 was inevitably ‘unexpected’, important preparedness actions were largely overlooked such as building key risk communication capacities.

COVID-19: Reflections on trust, tradeoffs, and preparedness, April 2020

Journal of Risk Research

Dominic HP Balog-Way and Katherine A McComas

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340958173_COVID-19_Reflections_on_trust_tradeoffs_and_preparedness/references?utm_medium=email&utm_source=researchgate&utm_campaign=re413&loginT=iZBjE6QqKQDtgm9mIth3elm18k_fuz-NWD_VJXbuMq0_VSlbSUu0QyWSAb06_bTWyEX92MLG8X_6SgQ&pli=1&utm_term=re413_p_pb&utm_content=re413_p_pb_p4&cp=re413_p_pb_p4&uid=nL3zUTnj0PdkgYxg8hJW1mCbrq7iJZlhMSga&ch=reg

When our eldest daughter was about six-weeks-old in 1987, my ex and I took her to a Grateful Dead concert at an outdoor amphitheater north of Toronto. We sat at the back. The dead did this Buddy Holly song as part of their encore and it was fabulous.

Rates of FBI going nowhere

Is unconditional love a real thing? Is it possible to maximize an individual’s goals and relationships at the same time? Is microbial foodborne illness still a thing?

Unconditional is a subjective word that means different things to different people.

Rather than going for the safe middle in conflict resolution, I have a therapist who says, go for the jugular: have a great relationship and go after great goals (note: it helps if you tell your partner what you want in terms of the relationship and goals).

Microbial foodborne illness rates in the U.S. have been stagnant for 15 years. It’s a thing, but it’s not clear who cares.

The Washington Post stated back in the day, “Between 1998 and 2004, illnesses reported by CDC that were caused by E. Coli, listeria, campylobacter and a few other bacteria decreased by 25 to 30 percent, perhaps because of improvements in the handling of meat and eggs. Since about 2004, however, the rate of these illnesses has basically remained steady.”

There’s lots of new media toys out there, but it’s the high-tech version of signs that say, “Employees Must Wash Hands.” Reposting press releases – especially in the absence of critical analysis — is a waste of bandwidth and resources. And there is no evidence it results in fewer sick people.

Last week, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control reiterated the incidence of most infections transmitted commonly through food has not declined for many years.

Incidence of infections caused by Listeria, Salmonella, and Shigella remained unchanged, and those caused by all other pathogens reported to FoodNet increased during 2019. Infections caused by Salmonella serotype Enteritidis, did not decline; however, serotype Typhimurium infections continued to decline.

New strategies that target particular serotypes and more widespread implementation of known prevention measures are needed to reduce Salmonella illnesses. Reductions in Salmonella serotype Typhimurium suggest that targeted interventions (e.g., vaccinating chickens and other food animals) might decrease human infections. Isolates are needed to subtype bacteria so that sources of illnesses can be determined.

I’ve been harping about the need for new messages and new media for 15 years – even did a road trip in 2009 with a number of talks stressing this point – with apparently little effect.

So maybe I’ll focus on relationships and being the best partner, father and person I can be.

Peace and love.

Preliminary incidence and trends of infections with pathogens transmitted commonly through food—foodborne diseases active surveillance network, 10 US sites, 2016-2019, 01 May 2020

Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report pp.509-514

Danielle M. Tack, DVM1; Logan Ray, MPH1; Patricia M. Griffin, MD1; Paul R. Cieslak, MD2; John Dunn, DVM3; Tamara Rissman, MPH4; Rachel Jervis, MPH5; Sarah Lathrop, PhD6; Alison Muse, MPH7; Monique Duwell, MD8; Kirk Smith, DVM9; Melissa Tobin-D’Angelo, MD10; Duc J. Vugia, MD11; Joanna Zablotsky Kufel, PhD12; Beverly J. Wolpert, PhD13; Robert Tauxe, MD1; Daniel C. Payne, PhD1

https://www.cdc.gov/mmw/volumes/69/wr/mm6917a1.htm?s_cid=mm6917a1_w&deliveryName=USCDC_921-DM26943